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avoid a patchwork approach to regulating CO 2 . 1 Even as EPA announced this important step, the press release reiterated the agency's "preference for comprehensive legislation to address this issue…" (U.S. EPA 2009a). Which process will be completed first is anybody's guess.
Most of the attention is on the basic architecture of federal climate legislation-the design of a national cap-and-trade program and the policies and funding of the many other initiatives to reduce energy consumption, stimulate cleaner technologies, and address adaptation.
However, another issue garnering attention is the role of state governments once a federal climate program is in place. Because many states already have climate programs underway and under consideration, a key question that Congress must grapple with in any climate legislation is how to integrate the current and future climate programs: which elements of climate policy will remain with the states, and how will state and federal programs interact?
It is important to acknowledge the growing activity on state-federal climate issues over the past few years. Many organizations have hosted conferences and discussions about statefederal roles in climate change, including the National Association of Clear Air Agencies, The Pew Center on Climate Change, the Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management, the World Resources Institute, the Nicholas Institute at Duke University, and the recently formed Georgetown Law School State-Federal Climate Center. There have also been many thoughtful and interesting papers written on this topic; a list of references is included at the end of this report. This paper builds on this work, although needless to say, any errors are the authors' responsibility.
Resources for the Future hosted a one-day conference on the role of states under federal climate legislation on February 27, 2009, in Washington, D.C. 2 The purpose of the conference was to bring together a cross-section of players from the full panoply of stakeholders-state and federal agencies, industry, environmental and other nongovernmental organizations, and academics-to discuss the states' role in the major areas of likely federal climate legislation: cap and trade, renewable portfolio standards, and efforts to increase energy efficiency and reduce vehicle miles traveled.
1 A secondary concern is that regulating greenhouse gases through the Clean Air Act might leave the regulation vulnerable to litigation, much as the EPA's Clean Air Interstate Ruling (CAIR) was contested. The CAIR ruling would have tightened regulations for SO 2 and NO x but was vacated by the U.S District Court of Appeals in 2008 and remanded to EPA to fix later that year. Its future remains uncertain. 2 For a brief summary of the conference and copies of the agenda and presentations, go to http://www.rff.org/Events/Pages/Role_States_Federal_Climate_Change_Legislation_.aspx. This paper is an outgrowth of the February conference. Instead of summarizing the presentations and discussions at the RFF conference, however, it provides an overview of some of the challenges of harmonizing state and federal climate programs, paying most attention to one issue-possible mechanisms for allowing state governments to set more stringent targets for greenhouse gas reduction than the federal government, colloquially referred to as "meet or exceed."
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background information on state and federal climate policies to date; in Section 3 we discuss the importance of each jurisdiction's roles in achieving greenhouse gas reductions; and in Section 4 we offer a guide to the possible mechanisms that would allow states to implement more stringent climate policies than a federal climate program might require. Section 5 concludes.
Overview of State Climate Programs
States have truly been the leaders in climate policy. The lack of action by the federal government on climate change left a void that many states have filled by implementing their own programs to reduce greenhouse gases. Climate change is inherently a global problem, requiring a solution to global emissions reductions. States were driven to enact their own climate policies by federal inaction; their efforts were intended to provide examples to other states and to the federal government, create precedent, and reap any economic or political benefits from acting early to address climate change (Keeler 2007) .
Efforts by states include the first regional cap-and-trade program in the United States for CO 2 emissions from electric utilities, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, or RGGI. Capand-trade programs place an overall limit on total emissions and thereby place a price on each ton of GHG, creating an incentive to reduce the emissions that cause climate change. Because firms can buy and sell CO 2 permits, the reductions that do take place will be the most efficientthat is, the least-cost reductions. Ten states in the Northeast participate in the RGGI cap-andtrade program, which held its first auction of CO 2 allowances in September 2008. Two other regional trading programs, which would include not only the electricity industry but the entire set of CO 2 -emitting sources, including industries and households, are in earlier stages of development. These are the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), made up of seven western states and four Canadian provinces, and the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (MGGRA), Figure 1 compares the rough emissions targets that the major CO 2 reduction programs aim to reach if each were national in scope, both with each other and with a business-as-usual (BAU) emissions trajectory-that is, with no emissions abatement program. Note that the stringency of a program is determined not just by the targets and timetables by which emissions must be reduced, but also by the percentage of greenhouse gas emissions it regulates. The more CO 2 sources that are regulated, the greater the stringency. In other words, an economy-wide program that covers greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity sector plus fuel importers, petroleum refiners, natural gas distributors, and other industrial sectors is more stringent than a program that covers the electricity sector only. Because RGGI has not created targets for emission reductions beyond 2018, projected emission targets do not go beyond this year.
Note: Targets for regional programs do not reflect the actual reductions that would be made. These trajectories reflect predicted reductions if each set of targets were adopted and implemented nationally. Renewable portfolio standards (RPS) require that a certain percentage of electricity be generated from renewable sources, such as solar, wind, or geothermal power. The targets, timetables, and definitions of "renewable" vary across state programs.
Net metering allows consumers who generate their own electricity (e.g., with the use of solar panels) to sell any excess electricity back to the grid.
Green pricing allows consumers to pay a small premium on their electric bill for electricity generation from renewable sources.
Energy efficiency resource standards (EERS) establish targets for minimum energy savings for electricity generation and, in some cases, for heating fuels. These standards encourage the adoption and use of cleaner, more efficient equipment and appliances. Instead of having a separate EERS, some states count energy efficiency toward meeting an RPS.
Building energy codes are established by states for both residential and commercial buildings. They stipulate design specifications for building materials and practices that have the potential to reduce energy consumption. The codes vary greatly by state.
Transportation plans to reduce vehicle miles traveled are typically made by metropolitan planning organizations, which are made up of local government and transportation authorities. Vehicle miles traveled (VMT) refers to the total number of miles driven during a specified period of time, such as one year. Plans to reduce VMT can include land-use planning that situates new residences closer to places of work, improved public transportation, and parking and rideshare policies. California's approach is worth noting: it has enacted legislation, SB 375, that establishes land use-related GHG goals and provides incentives for developers and local governments to achieve them. Table 1 shows the number of states that have adopted each of these types of policies. As noted above, states have been actively addressing greenhouse gas emissions in various How best to integrate state and federal climate policies is a difficult question. To harmonize building energy codes, the Waxman-Markey bill would require EPA to choose between existing state and federal codes, depending on which would result in the most costeffective energy savings 5 There are also provisions to equate different state RPS programs with the RPS in the Waxman-Markey bill; governors could petition for more stringent RPS targets and states would be able to control the rates charged for renewable electricity, as they do now through green pricing policies. 6 One concern is the high transaction costs associated with comparing state and federal policies and verifying and enforcing the overarching federal provisions. Adopting an RPS at the federal level has generated another concern as well: because states are naturally endowed with different sources of renewable energy in different amounts, it might make logistic and economic sense to allow states to choose whether to adopt RPS programs and to set the targets and timetables on a state-by-state basis (Apt et al. 2008 ).
Benefits of Federal and State Climate Programs
Overlapping federal and state cap-and-trade programs will, in some cases, be redundant and burdensome for both regulators and the regulated entities. However, there are benefits associated with regulating greenhouse gas emissions at both levels. In this section we offer suggestions for how to harness the benefits of both.
Regulating greenhouse gases at the federal level carries definite advantages. In the most basic sense, setting a federal target gives the United States a unified emissions reduction goal around which political efforts can rally both within the nation and in the international community. Many have argued that in international negotiations on climate change, a binding U.S. target may be helpful in encouraging developing countries to commit to legally binding targets of their own (Aldy and Stavins 2007 If subfederal cap-and-trade programs are less stringent than an eventual federal program, then federal law would have the ultimate say. As seen in Figure 1 , as rules and laws are finalized, the targets and coverage of many of the regional programs would be less stringent than the Waxman-Markey bill, and thus preempted. If the preemption (or harmonization) of state capand-trade programs is not explicitly addressed in federal legislation, any ensuing court cases to resolve overlapping programs could delay climate policy implementation and chip away at the political will to address climate change in the near term. It is worth noting that this issue is addressed in both Waxman-Markey, where subnational cap-and-trade programs are explicitly preempted, and Kerry-Boxer, although in this latter proposal, states would be allowed to continue running their own cap-and-trade programs if a federal program is delayed. In either case, it is generally agreed that bringing down greenhouse gas concentrations becomes more expensive and difficult as more time passes and emissions continue to climb, as in the businessas-usual scenario (see Figure 1 ). 9 For an overview of perspectives and evidence of the extent to which market failures and barriers prevent the adoption of energy efficient technology, see Newell et al. (1999) .
Indiana and Illinois offer one example. Even though they are neighboring states, the emissions profiles of their electricity sectors are strikingly different. Indiana's per capita greenhouse gas emissions are the highest in the Midwest, while Illinois (along with Michigan) has the lowest. Although population plays a role, it is the reliance on coal in Indiana and nuclear power in Illinois that drives this difference. Illinois has the greatest percentage of electricity produced by nuclear fuel of any U.S. state. In 2005 in Indiana, 95 percent of electricity was generated from coal; in the same year in Illinois, coal fueled only about 50 percent of electricity generation and nuclear power generated most of the rest ).
California may have a unique opportunity to achieve greenhouse gas reductions. Statewide, treating and conveying drinking water and disposing of wastewater take, on average, an estimated 19 percent of the power generated by the state's electricity sources, 30 percent of its nonelectric natural gas, and 88 billion gallons of diesel gas-making water the most energyintensive sector in the state (Navigant Consulting 2006; Krebs 2007) . Thus there is a large potential in California to decrease energy use and associated greenhouse gas emissions through limiting the consumption of water in parts of the state. Some have argued that the decision of whether to pursue this kind of opportunity is most appropriate at the state, not the federal, level (Doremus and Hanemann 2008) , Some have suggested that strategies that focus on land use, building codes, and energy efficiency, often referred to as complementary measures, could achieve as much as half the reductions needed to meet the targets set in proposed federal cap-and-trade legislation ). In addition, some federal officials have noted that because the emissions reductions achieved through state and local complementary measures are likely to be some of the most costeffective, they will be implemented first, and the more expensive compliance strategies will take place only after these avenues for reducing emissions have been fully exhausted.
Because both federal control of greenhouse gas policy and state-level emissions reductions are clearly advantageous, we discuss in the next section how a unified federal policy could allow and encourage states to continue making much-needed greenhouse gas emission reductions.
Options for More Stringent State Programs
State representatives have repeatedly said that their goal in crafting their own climate programs is to offer a model for a federal program, and that the adoption of a federal CO 2 trading program is, in fact, their main objective. That said, some state officials have voiced the desire to "preserve and enhance state and local authority to continue implementing innovative measures and programs that further reduce greenhouse gas emissions within their jurisdictions" in the event of federal climate legislation (Office of the Governors 2009).
One of the questions that Congress will need to address in any climate bill is whether the new federal program will give states the flexibility to attempt more ambitious reductions in CO 2 and other greenhouse gases than those set forth in the federal legislation. Several states would like the same flexibility they have under most environmental laws-to be allowed to exceed federal standards. 10 In addition, some states want to preserve their authority to regulate greenhouse gases in the future. Despite the new optimism that there will be a federal climate program soon, there is still concern that should the federal government falter, the states must be able to again take the lead.
In addition, as the locus of activity moves to the federal government, state representatives want their work to be recognized and rewarded and seek federal funds to continue (and expand) their climate programs, in the form of either allowances or grants. And, for sources under RGGI, a critical issue is whether the allowance auction revenues they have been receiving will be replaced and whether any "banked" allowances will retain their value under a future federal cap.
Waxman-Markey would respect the value of those emissions allowances in a dollar-for-dollar (not ton-for-ton) exchange.
Several recent papers include specific suggestions for approaches that would allow states the flexibility to implement a more stringent climate program than the federal government. 11 We have surveyed the existing literature and grouped the various suggestions into four basic approaches that could be employed to allow states to go beyond the federal program:
1. States retire federal allowances.
2. States require sources within their borders to submit a premium amount of CO 2 allowance for each ton emitted.
3. States implement their own cap-and-trade programs in lieu of the federal program; these programs are called carve-outs. 10 For example, under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, each state must submit to EPA an implementation plan to meet national ambient air quality standards. The state can choose to meet either national standards or those set by leader states in air policy, namely California, which are relatively more stringent. 11 For an interesting article that identifies a different but overlapping set of policy options, see 4. States regulate sources of greenhouse gases not addressed in the federal program.
After describing each approach, we discuss its strengths and weaknesses in terms of their effect on the total cost of the cap-and-trade program and the potential to accelerate or significantly increase emissions reductions in the United States.
States go beyond the cap by retiring federal allowances.
One way that a state could achieve more stringent greenhouse gas emission reductions than called for under federal legislation would be through the retirement of federal allowances. Retirement of allowances effectively lowers the federal cap because it reduces the total number of allowances that are available for use and, therefore, the total amount of CO 2 emissions allowed. States could retire allowances in one of two of ways: state agencies could purchase and retire federally auctioned allowances, or they could retire a portion of CO 2 allowances allocated directly to them under federal legislation.
Whether allowances originate from federal or state pools, the option to retire national allowances decreases the total number of allowances available nationally and therefore is likely to increase the price of the remaining allowances. Whether a state buys allowances on the open market or retires allowances allocated directly to them, it is giving up or forgoing revenues. This can be a very real cost to the states. If allowances are retired or purchased, the revenues lost will mean less money in state coffers-money that could have been used to balance state budgets, provide services, or finance complementary programs to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. If the economic recession continues, however, forgone revenues will be greatly decreased.
Concern that allowing states to retire federal allowances could lead to a much more stringent target or higher allowance prices has led to two suggested variations on this approach.
In a draft proposal published by the World Resources Institute and the Nicholas Institute, titled "Allowing States to Retire Allowances without Affecting National Allowance Prices: A Straw Proposal," suggest that states be able to retire federal allowances only if they can show that state programs have led to reductions in addition to those that would have occurred under the federal program. A major drawback of this approach is that it would require some mechanism for ensuring that states have achieved "additional" reductions. This would increase administrative and transaction costs and heighten uncertainty about actual reductions.
Another approach, taken in the federal climate bill by Waxman and Markey, is to expressly limit the amount of federal allowances states would be allowed to retire. This allows a state to implement a more stringent policy but limits the effect on the cap and on allowance prices.
2.
States go beyond the cap by requiring sources within their borders to submit a premium amount of reductions for each CO 2 allowance.
Some analysts have proposed that states be allowed to require that sources within their jurisdictions submit a premium number of federal allowances for every ton of CO 2 emitted. For example, states could decide that 1.1 federal allowances would satisfy compliance for every 1 ton of CO 2 emitted by in-state sources, thus effectively lowering the cap. As in option 1 above, where states retire federal allowances, this approach would effectively reduce the total number of federal allowances and their associated emissions. By requiring a premium amount of CO 2 reduction for each federal allowance, it would allow states to implement a more stringent cap without simply making additional emissions available to those outside their borders.
To the same end, some have suggested that states be given authority to impose restrictions on the sale of allowances. For example, states could restrict the sale of allowances to dirtier sources outside their borders. They could also require facilities that shut down to surrender any allowance holdings without selling them on the market ( If allowed, however, the ability to restrict the use and sale of allowances by states would have similar effects to allowing states to retire federal allowances: there are effectively fewer allowances, which would raise the price of allowances. At least in theory, this could lead to the migration of industries and their associated emissions to less stringently regulated areas of the country. In addition, this approach also tightens the national market for allowances and thus raises the marginal cost of compliance, which affects the allowance price seen by all sources.
12 For the complete decision, see Clean Air Markets Group v. Pataki et al. (available at http://openjurist.org/338/f3d/82/clean-air-markets-group-v-e-pataki-j-d-a-n).New York had been concerned that if upwind sources bought emissions allowances and surrendered these in lieu of emissions abatement, their emissions would be deposited as acid rain in New York. The court ruled that because it was a federal law, the Clean Air Act preempted New York's law; the sale of New York's SO 2 allowances was therefore permitted.
The extent to which these negative consequences materialize depends largely on the scale of the effect-that is, the amount of additional allowances required.
States are allowed complete jurisdiction over their own cap-and-trade programs (carve-out).
Another option is to allow states to carve out their own more stringent programs in lieu of the federal program-though as yet no state has indicated that it wants to implement this approach. A state that maintained the authority to implement its own separate cap-and-trade program could set the stringency of the cap for the state: sources would be subject only to the targets of the state cap, and no one source would be covered under more than one cap, thus the state would be "carved out" of the federal program.
Carve-outs could take one of two forms. They could be granted to state and regional cap- This scenario mirrors the Clean Air Act regulations, whereby states can choose to implement the ambient air emissions regulations set federally or, as California has done, adopt more stringent regulations. 13 In either case, however, multiple cap-and-trade programs operating within the United States could increase the costs of reducing CO 2 and complicate compliance for regulated sources. Some experts conclude that a carve-out for state or regional trading programs is not feasible or efficient, while others discuss the mechanisms necessary to help achieve such a policy. The most pressing design issue centers on the question of whether to allow sources covered under separate caps to trade emissions allowance credits with one another. The argument for trading is economic efficiency. In general, the broader the scope of the trading program and the greater the differences in the cost of abating CO 2 across sources, the greater the opportunity to flush out least-cost abatement. This opportunity also hinges on equating the marginal cost of abatement across the swath of covered sources. Equating this across multiple cap-and-trade programs is much more difficult than under a uniform cap because the implicit price put on emissions will differ with the stringency, coverage, and ease of abatement under each cap. The mixed market signals could result in a lack of transparency and even a reluctance of covered entities to make trades across caps (Burtraw et al. 2005 ).
There are additional concerns about the implications of carve-outs. Since smaller markets tend to be more sensitive to external conditions (such as changes in weather that could increase electricity and natural gas demand for heating and cooling in homes), another potential downfall of carve-outs could be the increased price volatility within each cap-and-trade program The climate bill passed by the U.S. House of Representatives would require an "economy-wide" cap (as opposed to a cap only on the electricity sector, as is the case in RGGI) that would cover 85 percent of all greenhouse gas emissions. This percentage includes almost all sources of CO 2 : electric power plants, large manufacturing facilities, and importers and distributors of natural gas and transportation fuels. It also includes a separate cap-and-trade system for hydrofluorocarbons, particularly potent greenhouse gases that are substitutes for ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons. Sources that emit less than 25,000 tonnes of CO 2 are exempted under the proposed bill. Also not included are fugitive emissions, which are emissions that cannot easily be monitored or counted because they leak undetected during industrial processes.
The remaining 15 percent of greenhouse gas emissions includes methane, which escapes invisibly from agricultural activities and landfills; nitrogen dioxide, also emitted from agricultural processes; and fluorinated gases (F-gases) from industrial processes. Any such sources not addressed in federal climate legislation would be candidates for state regulation, which would result in more stringent state climate programs.
The Waxman-Markey bill passed by the House not only includes an economy-wide CO 2 cap but also offers opportunities for the reduction of non-CO 2 emissions through its "offsets" provisions. Offsets allow emitters regulated under the cap to buy emission reductions from unregulated, typically non-CO 2 sources. Under the offsets provision in Waxman-Markey, for example, an electricity generator could choose to buy emissions reductions from a source outside the cap (say a farmer who has decreased methane emissions). Thus, the CO 2 emissions from the electricity generator would exceed its compliance obligation but would be offset by the methane reductions made by the farmer. If the final federal law is similar to the Waxman-Markey bill, few if any greenhouse gas emissions would not be covered either directly or, through offset provisions, indirectly.
Even if a future federal bill were economy-wide and included extensive offset provisions, however, the states would still have opportunity to regulate non-CO 2 gases. After all, though offset provisions target these gases, they are not binding requirements for reductions; they simply provide an alternative and voluntary compliance method to regulated firms. A state could require specific reductions in non-CO 2 greenhouse gases to ensure that these emissions are reduced. For example, a state could mandate and enforce methane capture at all landfills.
If states do regulate emissions outside the federal program, they would be imposing additional costs on local entities beyond those incurred in complying with the federal program.
These costs could eventually encourage some types of firms to migrate to a state with less stringent and costly regulations and cause emissions leakage; the projected emissions reductions would not be met. In addition, if a federal bill sought to encourage non-CO 2 greenhouse gas reductions, sources within a state that mandated reductions in these other gases would have to forgo the opportunity to receive valuable offset credits. Thus, these more expansive state programs could reduce opportunities for the rest of the nation to achieve least-cost emission reductions through offsets.
Concluding Thoughts
States with aggressive climate programs have pointed the way for federal climate policy.
By showing the political will to tackle a complex and expensive problem of far-reaching importance, they have created an impetus for federal action. As federal policymakers work out a national approach, however, harmonizing existing state and future federal policies will be critical to ensuring an effective approach to reducing greenhouse gases. In this paper we have tried to shed light on the economic, legal, and political implications of integrating state and federal policies, and we have explored some potential ways states could continue to serve as leaders even under a national program to address climate change.
